In final-offer selection arbitration, each party submits a single final number to the arbitrator, who is bound to select one of the two submitted figures in its entirety. The arbitrator cannot average them, split the difference, or impose a different number of their own choosing.

This structure is sometimes called baseball arbitration because of its use in Major League Baseball salary disputes, and it deliberately punishes unreasonable positioning: because moderate, well-supported numbers are more likely to be picked than extreme ones, the format pushes both sides toward realistic final offers rather than anchoring aggressively.

Juricratic models final-offer selection arbitration as a discrete, non-continuous resolution branch on the negotiation dial. Rather than the smooth settlement-range distribution used for ordinary bargaining, the simulation treats the outcome as a binary selection between the two submitted numbers, and can show how each side's incentive to moderate its offer changes as a result.

Parties choose final-offer arbitration specifically to discourage extreme positioning and to get a faster, cheaper resolution than a full evidentiary arbitration or trial, and each side's strategic focus shifts from arguing case merits broadly to picking the single most defensible number the arbitrator is likely to select.